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corporate characteristics can be achieved for the most part under modern
partnership agreements.
In view of all of these factors, professionals should carefully study
their individual and group needs and goals before making a decision to
incorporate.
JOHN E. BUGG
The New North Carolina Wrongful Death Statute
Anyone intending to sue for wrongful death in North Carolina must
concern himself with four sections in Chapter 28 of the General Statutes.
Sections 28-172 and 28-175, which will be referred to as the "survival
statute" in this comment, permit recovery for the decedent's medical ex-
penses, pain and suffering, and other damages incurred before his death.
The decedent's right of action for these damages "survives" him and
passes to his estate. Sections 28-173 and 28-174, which will be referred
to as the "wrongful death statute," grant recovery to the decedent's heirs
for certain losses that result from his death.
The 1969 General Assembly completely rewrote section 28-1741 of the
1 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-174 (Supp. 1969), rewriting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-174
(1966), states:
(a) Damages recoverable for death by wrongful act include:
(1) Expenses for care, treatment and hospitalization incident to the
injury resulting in death;
(2) Compensation for pain and suffering of the decedent;
(3) The reasonable funeral expenses of the decedent;
(4) The present monetary value of the decedent to the persons entitled
to receive the" damages recovered, including but not limited to com-
pensation for the loss of the reasonably expected:
a. Net income of the decedent,
b. Services, protection, care and assistance of the decedent,
whether voluntary or obligatory, to the persons entitled to the
damages recovered,
c. Society, companionship, comfort, guidance, kindly offices and
advice of the decedent to the persons entitled to the damages
recovered;
(5) Such punitive damages as the decedent could have recovered had
he survived, and punitive damages for wrongfully causing the
death of the decedent through maliciousness, wilful or wanton
injury, or gross negligence;
(6) Nominal damages when the jury so finds.
(b) All evidence which reasonably tends to establish any of the elements of
damages included in subsection (a), or otherwise reasonably tends to
establish the present monetary value of the decedent to the persons
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wrongful death statute. The rewritten section in no way resembles its
predecessor, and its effect will not be limited to damages for wrongful
death. This comment will discuss the new section and its practical conse-
quences.
SCOPE oF THE NEW STATUTE
The new section's intended scope is stated in the preamble:
WHEREAS, human life is inherently valuable; and
WHEREAS, the present statute is so written and construed that
damages recoverable from a person who has caused death by a
wrongful act are effectively limited to such figure as can be calculated
from the expected earnings of the deceased, which is far from an
adequate measure of the value of human life....
The old section allowed recovery only for "such damages as are a fair
and just compensation for the pecuniary injury."3 Now medical expenses
that result from the injury,4 the decedent's pain and suffering,5 funeral
expenses," punitive damages,7 and nominal damages,8 all of which were
excluded under the old statute and case law,' can be recovered in wrongful
death actions. The new section also provides recovery for "the present
monetary value of the decedent to the persons entitled to receive the
damages recovered. . .. ""
This provision should produce a fundamental change in the measure-
ment of loss due to wrongful death. The "present monetary value" in-
cludes eleven specific elements, 1 but it is not limited to them. The courts:
entitled to receive the damages recovered, is admissible in an action for
damages for death by wrongful act.
2 Ch. 215, § 1, [1969] N.C. Sess. L. -, which became N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-174
(Supp. 1969).
Ch. 113, § 71, [1868] N.C. Sess. L. 276, which remained unchanged until 1969
as N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-174 (1966).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-174(a)(1) (Supp. 1969).
5 Id. §28-174(a) (2).
Id. § 28-174(a) (3).
'Id. § 28-174(a) (5).
'id. § 28-174(a) (6).
Ch. 113, § 71, [1868] N.C. Sess. L. 276. See Armentrout v. Hughes, 247 N.C.
631, 632, 101 S.E.2d 793, 794 (1958) (punitive and nominal damages not recover-
able); Hoke v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 226 N.C. 332, 337, 38 S.E.2d 105,
109 (1946) (damages sustained during lifetime not recoverable); Crawford v.
Hudson, 3 N.C. App. 555, 557, 165 S.E.2d 557, 559 (1969) (funeral expenses ex-
cluded).
0N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-174 (a) (4) (Supp. 1969).
1 Id. § 28-174(a) (4)a-c.
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are therefore given a chance to re-examine some of the principles estab-
lished under the old statute and to make sweeping changes if they are
.merited. For instance, a court can deduct for income tax savings1 2 or
allow any damages in addition to those listed that reasonably reflect "the
present monetary value of the decedent to the persons entitled to receive
the damages recovered." Damages can be tailored to fit the circumstances
in each case.
Net Income
Net incomea3 is the first of the eleven specific losses that can be
recovered under the new section of the wrongful death statute. By this
term, the legislature probably meant to perpetuate the old statute's measure
of loss based on the concept of "pecuniary injury," which has been
defined as
[t]he present value of the net pecuniary worth of the deceased to be
ascertained by deducting the cost of his own living and expenditures
from the gross income, based upon his life expectancy. As a basis on
which to enable the jury to make their estimate, it is competent to
show, and for them to consider the age of the deceased, his prospects
in life, his habits, his character, his industry and skill, the means he
had for making money, the business in which he was employed-the
end of it all being to enable the jury to fix upon the net income which
might be reasonably expected if death had not ensued .... 14
However, net income under the new statute does not have to be identical
to the net income described above. Since the new statute emphasizes the
decedent's value to the beneficiaries,15 the award could be limited, as in
most jurisdictions, to the portion of the income that the beneficiaries
See, e.g., O'Conner v. United States, 269 F.2d 578, 584 (2d Cir. 1959);
Brooks v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 619 (D.S.C. 1967); Furumizo v. United
States, 245 F. Supp. 981 (D. Hawaii 1965) ; Note, Damages-Rightfil Recovery for
Wrongful Death--The Income Tax Factor, 46 N.C.L. REv. 941 (1968).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-174(a)(4)a (Supp. 1969).
" Mendenhall v. North Carolina R.R., 123 N.C. 275, 278, 31 S.E. 480 (1898)
.'(emphasis added). See also Rea v. Simowitz, 226 N.C. 379, 381, 38 S.E. 194, 196
(1946); Carpenter v. Asheville Power & Light Co., 191 N.C. 130, 131 S.E. 400
(1925). For a discussion of the history and development of North Carolina case
law on this subject, see Comment, Wrongfid Death Damages in North Carolina,
44 N.C.L. RBv. 402, 429-32 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Wrongful Death Damages].
"5 "The present monetary value of the decedent to the persons entitled to




would have actually received had he lived.' 6 But "pecuniary injury" has
been thoroughly defined and delineated by case law, 17 and the courts
should continue to apply this measure of loss of net income. Since it is
not certain who would have received the income remaining after the
decedent's personal expenditures had he lived, it is reasonable to presume
that the surplus would have gone to the beneficiaries in the form of con-
tributions or inheritance. Any new limitation on damages recoverable
would probably be contrary to the legislature's obvious intent to expand
wrongful death recovery.
The Other Ten Enumerated Losses
Besides net income, ten other elements are specifically enumerated as
part of the "present monetary value of the decedent" for which recovery
can be had. They are "services, protection, care and assistance [rendered
by] the decedent, whether voluntary or obligatory,"'" and "society, com-
panionship, comfort, guidance, kindly offices and advice . . ."I Prior
North Carolina case law did not permit recovery of such losses20 because
the courts defined "pecuniary injury" to apply only to net income.21
But similar losses have long been recoverable as "pecuniary" in many
other jurisdictions, 2 and a few statutes other than North Carolina's
specifically enumerate one or more of these ten losses as recoverable.2
Jurisdictions that allow recovery for similar losses have had to grapple
with whether to allow beneficiaries to recover for grief and mental suffer-
ing. The great majority purport not to allow such compensation. 24 By
use of the term "monetary value of the decedent," the North Carolina
Legislature also seems to have prohibited solatium since the beneficiaries'
grief and suffering have nothing to do with the decedent's monetary
worth. Companionship, society, and related benefits may be given a value
"'See C. McCoRmIcx, DAMAGES 344-45 (1935); W. PRoss~E, LAW OF TORTS
928 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as PRossm].1 See Wrongfid Death Danages 429-32.
"8N.C. GEx. STAT. § 28-174(a) (4)b (Supp. 1969) (emphasis added).
10 Id. § 28-174(a) (4)c (emphasis added).
no E.g., Scriven v. McDonald, 264 N.C. 727, 142 S.E.2d 585 (1965); Lamm v.
Lorbacher, 235 N.C. 728, 731, 71 S.E.2d 49, 52 (1952).
" See note 14 mtpra.
" Annot., 74 A.L.R. 11 (1931); PRoSSER 929-30. See, e.g., Hall v. Gillins, 13
Ill. 2d 26, 147 N.E.2d 352 (1958); Hertz v. McDowell, 358 Mo. 383, 214 S.W.2d
546 (1948); Prauss v. Adamski, 195 Ore. 1, 244 P.2d 598 (1952).
2 'ALAS, STAT. § 13.20.340(c) (2) (1962) ; HAWAII IEv. LAWS § 663-3 (1967);
Wis. STAT. § 331.04(4) (1957) ; Wxo. STAT. ANx. § 1-1066 (1957).
' PRossER 929-30.
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by measuring the decedent's services as a companion and confidant with-
out awarding solatium.25 Without solatium, it is possible to classify
the ten enumerated elements as services20 that have a monetary value but
would not have produced income for the decedent.
The provision in the new statute for recovery for loss of services that
have monetary worth but do not produce income led to its legislative nick-
name: "The Wife Bill." Housewives obviously perform many services
that do not directly yield income. But a substantial number of services
may also be lost when a child or a husband-father is killed, especially if
the husband-father is
[a] good home handyman who repairs the vacuum cleaner, unclogs
the plumbing, paints the house, points the mortar, washes the win-
dows, sets the storm sash, builds cupboards ... chauffeurs the family;
and . . . is an educator who trains the children in swimming and
sailing, fishing, camping and other sports .... 27
Juries will have to consider the actual loss sustained by the bene-
ficiaries to award damages for loss of services. These losses cannot be
intelligently measured without considering the decedent's relationship
with each individual beneficiary. Therefore, awards for services should
be small in such cases as Hepp v. Ader.28 In that case, one beneficiary,
the decedent's thirty-three-year-old daughter, was shown to have been
married, living away from her mother's home, and communicating rarely
with her.2
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Punitive damages could not be recovered in a wrongful death action
under prior North Carolina law." The new statute grants
[s]uch punitive damages as the decedent could have recovered had he
survived, and punitive damages for wrongfully causing the death of
the decedent through maliciousness, wilful or wanton injury, or gross
negligence.31
"Pennsylvania R.R. v. Goodman, 62 Pa. 3,29, 339 (1869).
2 See PROSSER 930.
"'Page, Damages for Wrongful Death-Broadening View of Pecuniary Loss,
30 NACCA L.J. 217 (1964), reprinted in 1 DAMAGES IN PERSONAL INJURY AND
WRONGFUL DEATrr CASES 383, 388 (S. Schreiber ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as
Page].
"64 Idaho 240, 130 P.2d 859 (1942)."Id. at 244-45, 130 P.2d at 861-62.
" Armentrout v. Hughes, 247 N.C. 631, 632, 101 S.E.2d 793, 794 (1958).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-174(a) (5) (Supp. 1969).
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Part of the new provision appears to be surplusage. If the per-
sonal representative can recover "the punitive damages the decedent
could have recovered had he survived," does he gain anything by also
being allowed to recover punitive damages for the tort-feasor's "wrong-
fully causing the decedent's death through maliciousness, wilful or wanton
injury, or gross negligence ?,,32 Perhaps the wording of the new section
permits recovery for death caused by acts that are malicious, wilful or
wanton, or grossly negligent and for other behavior that would justify
recovery of punitive damages under common law.'
EVIDENCE
Recovery for loss of services will alter North Carolina's rules of evi-
dence in wrongful death cases. The legislature anticipated these changes
by providing:
All evidence which reasonably tends to establish any of the elements
of damages included in subsection (a), or otherwise reasonably tends
to establish the present monetary value of the decedent to the persons
entitled to receive the damages recovered, is admissible in an action for
damages for death by wrongful act.3 4
Plaintiffs in wrongful death actions did not have to allege or prove the
existence of beneficiaries under prior North Carolina case law.3 5 Evidence
of their existence, identity, or number was, in fact, considered immaterial
unless a beneficiary would be inequitably enriched if he were permitted to
share in the award3 But juries cannot make intelligent awards under
' A number of common-law cases use words similar or identical to "malicious-
ness," "gross negligence," and "wilful and wanton injury" to describe acts that
may be grounds for punitive damages. E.g., Lutz Indus., Inc. v. Dixie Home Stores,
242 N.C. 332, 344, 88 S.E.2d 333, 342 (1955) ("actual malice," "wanton and reck-
less disregard of plaintiff's rights"); Swinton v. Savoy Realty Co., 236 N.C. 723,
725, 73 S.E.2d 785, 787 (1953) ("wilfully") ; Binder v. General Motors Acceptance
Corp., 222 N.C. 512, 516, 23 S.E.2d 894, 896 (1943) ("gross negligence");
Horton v. Carolina Coach Co., 216 N.C. 567, 569, 5 S.E.2d 828, 830 (1939) (gross
negligence, wilful tort); Hodges v. Hall, 172 N.C. 29, 30, 89 S.E. 802, 802 (1916)
(maliciousness).
"' A number of other grounds for recovery of punitive damages exist at common
law although few involve the type of act that is likely to cause death. E.g., Robin-
son v. McAlhaney, 214 N.C. 180, 184, 198 S.E. 647, 650 (1938) (fraud, oppression,
wilful and wanton aggravation).
"N.C. Gmq. STAT. § 28-174(b) (Supp. 1969).
" Warner v. Western N.C.R.R., 94 N.C. 250 (1886).
"McCoy v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 229 N.C. 57, 59, 47 S.E.2d 532, 534
(1948) (dictum). But cf. Hicks v. Love, 201 N.C. 773, 776-77, 161 S.E. 394, 395-
96 (1931).
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the new law without detailed information about the beneficiaries, and its
drafters were correct in rejecting the prior holdings that excluded such
evidence. Loss of companionship, services, and related damages cannot
be assessed without taking note of the specific relationship between the
decedent and each individual beneficiary.
PROOF
Much has been written about proving loss of services in wrongful
death actions. The following is a very brief summary of some of that
material.8
Most jurisdictions require that the plaintiff prove the existence of
benefits that the survivors would have enjoyed although the monetary
value of these benefits may be left to the jury's discretion. 8 Their existence
is often proved by testimony of the decedent's family and friends8 Proof
of the monetary value of the decedent's services, even though not com-
pulsory, is usually helpful to the plaintiff, and all jurisdictions that have
considered the question have allowed such proof.
40
Evidence of the value of a housewife's services can be presented in
a highly sophisticated form and is an excellent subject for expert testi-
mony.41
The cases dealing with the use of an expert have approved the
testimony of experts in the following categories: (1) an employment
specialist, usually the manager or an employee of a private or gov-
ernment employment agency, (2) a professional home economist or
other person trained in economics, (3) a family relations expert, in-
cluding managers and employees of community service, welfare, and
philanthropic organizations. 42
INCONSISTENCIES
The new section of the wrongful death statute permits recovery for two
elements of damages that previously were covered only by the survival
"See, e.g., Page, supra note 27; Comment, Torts-Wrongfie Death--How
Mitch is a Good Wife Worth?, 33 Mo. L. REv. 462 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
How Much is a Good Wife Worth]; Comment, Damages in Wrongfid Death and
Survival Actions, 29 Ouio ST. L.J. 420 (1968).
"' Page, supra note 27, at 3,87.
" How Much is a Good Wife Worth 465.
,' Page, supra note 27, at 386-87; How Much is a Good Wife Worth 469.
"'See Lithgow v. Hamilton, 69 So. 2d 776, 779 (Fla. 1954). For illustrations
of the possible subject matter of expert testimony concerning a housewife's services,
see 16 Am. JuR. PROOF oF FAcrs 859-70 (1965).
"'How Much is a Good Wife Worth, supra note 37, at 471.
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statute: "[e]xpenses for care, treatment and hospitalization incident to the
injury resulting in death" 3 and "[c] ompensation for pain and suffering
of the decedent." 44 The survival statute itself has not been changed, and
case law to date holds that the survival and wrongful death statutes grant
two distinct causes of action and that damages allowed under each must
be pleaded and determined separately.45 This rule worked well in the
past because the items recoverable under each statute formerly were
mutually exclusive.4 6 But if the rule is applied now, it will permit double
recovery of a single loss.
This problem is not eliminated by the clause in the new wrongful
death statute that was intended to repeal "all laws and clauses of laws in
conflict with this act"47 because only two of the many functions of the
survival statute, as interpreted by the courts, are in conflict. The survival
statute grants a cause of action against a wrongdoer's estate.4 Case law
interpreting it permits recoveries for medical expenses and pain and suffer-
ing, for earnings lost before death, and for injuries that did not cause
death .4  Repeal of the survival statute or any particular clause in it would
eliminate both its non-conflicting functions and its identical ones. The
courts, of course, might hold that only those specific applications of the
survival statute that conflict with the new wrongful death statute are
invalidated. But if such a rule is adopted, problems will remain.
Medical Claimcnts
Any recovery under the survival statute is subject to ordinary claims
against the estate, and to a lien in favor of claimants for the last medical
expenses,50 while recovery for wrongful death is subject only to claims
for funeral expenses and for medical expenses up to five hundred dollars.51
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-174(a) (1) (Supp. 1969).
"Id. § 28-174(a) (2).
Sharpe v. Pugh, 270 N.C. 598, 601, 155 S.E.2d 108, 111 (1967) ; In re Pea-
cock, 261 N.C. 749, 751, 136 S.E.2d 91, 93 (1964); Hinson v. Dawson, 241 N.C.
714, 718, 86 S.E.2d 585, 588 (1955) ; Hoke v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 226 N.C.
3.32, 38 S.E.2d 105 (1946).
"Hoke v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 226 N.C. 332, 337, 38 S.E.2d 105, 110
(1946).
11 Ch. 215, § 1, [1969] N.C. Sess. L.
,8 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-172 (1966).
"' Brendle v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 408 F.2d 116 (4th Cir. 1969) ; Hoke
v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 226 N.C. 332, 336-37, 38 S.E.2d 105, 109 (1946);
Fuquay v. A. & W. Ry., 199 N.C. 499, 155 S.E.2d 167 (1930).
5 N.C. GEN. STAT. §44-49 (1966); It re Peacock, 261 N.C. 749, 751, 136
S.E.2d 91, 93 (1964)."1 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-173 (1966).
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If medical expenses can be recovered only through the wrongful death
statute, medical claimants can together assert a claim to no more than
five hundred dollars, and such a result would be a windfall for the
beneficiaries.
A better solution would be to require that damages subject to dual
recovery be sought together in the same action and be apportioned
equitably among the claimants. The common-law doctrine of merger and
the policy against splitting a cause of action arguably require this re-
sult. The personal representative must bring his entire action in one
suit or see the remainder merged with the original judgment.5 2 There is,
however, one obstacle. A judgment on one cause of action does not merge
with a separate cause of action,5 and the North Carolina Supreme Court
held in Hoke v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp. 4 that the survival and the
wrongful death actions are separate and distinct causes of action.5c One
basis for the decision, however, was that there was "no overlapping of
the amount recoverable" 5 under the survival and wrongful death statutes
in force at the time. The overlap exists now, and it should invoke applica-
tion of the merger rule.
Moreover, rule 19 of the new North Carolina Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure makes compulsory the joinder of claimants "united in interest."
The personal representative can be viewed as asserting two separate
claims, one belonging to the estate and the other to the beneficiaries
under the wrongful death statute.5" Rule 19, therefore, arguably requires
that the two claims be asserted in the same action.
If joinder of causes or parties is perfected, there will remain the
problem of apportioning the award among the claimants and the bene-
ficiaries. In In re Peacock,5" the court dealt with an analogous appor-
tionment problem resulting from the settlement of an action without the
parties' designating whether the funds represented recovery under the
"2 Cf. Gaither Corp. v. Skinner, 241 N.C. 532, 535, 85 S.E.2d 909, 911 (1955) ;
Allison v. Steele, 220 N.C. 318, 326, 17 S.E.2d 339, 344 (1941); Bruton v. Caro-
lina Power & Light Co., 217 N.C. 1, 7, 6 S.E.2d 822, 826 (1939) ; Blume, Required
Joinder of Claims, 45 MicH. L. REv. 797 (1947).
"See Gosnell v. Southern Ry., 202 N.C. 234, 237-38, 162 S.E. 569, 571 (1932);
cf. Gaither Corp. v. Skinner, 241 N.C. 532, 535-36, 85 S.E.2d 909, 911 (1955);
Bruton v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 217 N.C. 1, 7, 6 S.E.2d 822, 826 (1939).
226 N.C. 332, 38 S.E.2d 105 (1946).
5 Id. at 337, 38 S.E.2d at 109-10.
reId.
"See Note, Survival of Personal Injury Actions in North Carolina, 25 N.C.L.
Rnv. 84, 87 (1946).
"261 N.C. 749, 136 S.E.2d 91 (1964).
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survival statute or the wrongful death statute. The medical claimants and
the decedent's beneficiaries each asserted a right to the limited funds. In
apportioning the funds, the court subtracted attorney's fees, court costs,
and administration fees and split the remainder in half. One half went
to the medical claimants under the survival statute; the beneficiaries
received the other half under the wrongful death law, less the five-hundred-
dollar maximum claim for medical expenses, which was added to the
medical claimants' award. General verdicts under the new wrongful death
statute might be handled in much the same way. In case there is a
special verdict, a sound approach would allow the court partial discretion
in apportioning the award.
Funeral Expenses
Funeral expenses can now be recovered in North Carolina in a
wrongful death action.59 They have been held not recoverable in a
survival action on the theory that the decedent had no right to them
before his death."0 However, a recent case from the North Carolina
Court of Appeals, Craujord v. Hudson,6' may now permit double re-
covery of funeral expenses from the tortfeasor. Crawford held that the
father could recover for his child's funeral expenses although he had
already recovered damages (but not funeral expenses) as the child's
personal representative in a wrongful death action. The court said that
" 'the ends of justice and equity' require a finding that the plaintiff in
this case has stated a valid cause of action" 2 since "the father of an un-
emancipated minor child is liable for the reasonable funeral expenses of
such child""3 and "the father . . .would not be able to recover such
expenses from the wrongful death funds." 4 An argument based on
Crazword may not be valid under the new form of the wrongful death
statute if the personal representative has already recovered funeral ex-
penses since "the ends of justice and equity" do not demand dual re-
covery.
A father has no guarantee, however, that he will be able to recoup
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-174(a) (3) (Supp. 1969).
0"22 Aii. JUR. 2d Danzages § 127 (1965). Cf. Hoke v. Atlantic Greyhound
Corp., 226 N.C. 332, 337, 38 S.E.2d 105, 109 (1946).
" *3 N.C. App. 555, 165 S.E.2d 557 (1969).
'Id. at 559, 165 S.E.2d at 560.
01 Id. at 557, 165 S.E.2d at 559.01 Id. at 558, 165 S.E.2d at 560.
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completely funeral expenses from the wrongful death recovery because
other beneficiaries may share in it. This problem can be easily solved by
allowing a father who has paid the funeral expenses of his child to
assert a claim under section 28-173 against the sum recovered in the
wrongful death action. In cases in which no wrongful death action has
been brought, the father should be allowed his right under Crawford to
sue for the funeral expenses, and the personal representative should be
joined in the action under rule 19.5 The court should require joinder of
the father in any wrongful death action brought by a minor's personal
representative to prevent the possibility of double recovery for funeral
expenses.
Distribution of the Proceeds
The newly-revised statute continues to provide for distribution of
wrongful death awards to the beneficiaries as determined by the intestate
succession act. 6 This method was reasonable when recovery was based
solely upon the deceased's net income, but now the awards will also reflect
the loss to each beneficiary of the decedent's services. In some cases,
therefore, damages will be distributed to persons who have not suffered
the loss upon which the award was based.
Courts in other states have departed from similar statutory provisions
for distribution when to follow the intestate act's scheme would be highly
unjust.6 7 The North Carolina Supreme Court has refused to allow one
who would be a beneficiary under the intestate succession act to share in
the distribution when he was contributorily negligent in the death of the
decedent6 s or when the recovery was in the form of a settlement from the
negligent beneficiary's liability insurance carrier.6" The intestate scheme
of distribution should also be abandoned when the beneficiary who has
suffered most of the compensable loss would be denied a fair share of
the recovery.
"n See p. 602 supra.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-173 (1966).
"'E.g., Armstrong v. Berk, 96 F. Supp. 182 (E.D. Pa. 1951) ; Duzan v. Myers,
30 Ind. App. 227, 65 N.E. 1046 (1903); Eichorn v. New Orleans & C.R.R. Light
& Power Co., 114 La. 711, 38 So. 526 (1904); Wolf v. Lake Erie & W.R.R., 55
Ohio St. 517, 45 N.E. 708 (1896); Annot., 14 A.L.R. 516, 520-29 (1921).
8First Union Nat'l Bank v. Hackney, 266 N.C. 17, 145 S.E.2d 352 (1965);
Cox v. Shaw, 263 N.C. 361, 139 S.E.2d. 676 (1965) ; Forgy v. Schwartz, 262 N.C.
185, 136 S.E.2d 668 (1964) (dictum).
"In re Estate of Ives, 248 N.C. 176, 102 S.E.2d 807 (1958).
[Vol. 48
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EFFECTS OF THE NEW STATUTE
Children
Russell v. Windsor Steamboat CoY° established the North Carolina
method of determining pecuniary loss in cases involving wrongful death
of children:
We see no distinction in the law, nor reason for distinction, be-
tween the death of a child and of an adult. The measure of damages
is the same ....
Where life is lost by reason of actionable negligence of another,
the measure of damages is the present value of the net pecuniary worth
of the life of the deceased, to be ascertained by deducting the probable
cost of his own living from the probable gross income derived from his
own exertions, based upon his life expectancy. 71
Since the newly-revised statute makes no special provision for children,
presumably North Carolina courts will continue to treat children and
adults equally in measuring damages for wrongful death. Obviously, an
award consisting of a child's net income over his full life expectancy plus
damages for loss of his services could be incredibly large, and the courts
may now look for ways under the new statute to limit recovery. One
possibility is to deduct what the beneficiaries would have spent on the
child, had he survived, from the award for loss of services and companion-
ship on the theory that the resulting amount would be a more accurate
measure of the "monetary value of the decedent to the ... beneficiaries."
New Causes of Action
The new law's provision for nominal damages2 will presumably allow
a cause of action simply upon the showing of a negligently-inflicted death.
Armentrout v. Hughes,78 which denied a cause of action for the death of
an eighty-year-old woman because there could be no reasonable expectation
of pecuniary loss, and Scriven v. McDonald,74 which denied a cause of
70 126 N.C. 961, 36 S.E. 191 (1900).
71 Id. at 967, 36 S.E. at 192-93. See also Burton v. Croghan, 265 N.C. 392,
144 S.E.2d 147 (1965); Rea v. Simowitz, 226 N.C. 379, 38 S.E.2d 194 (1946);
Queen City Coach Co. v. Lee, 218 N.C. 320, 11 S.E.2d 341 (1940); Comer v. City
of Winston-Salem, 178 N.C. 383, 100 S.E. 619 (1919); Gurley v. Southern Power
Co., 172 N.C. 690, 90 S.E. 943 (1916).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-174(a) (6) (Supp. 1969).
247 N.C. 631, 101 S.E.2d 793 (1958).
'264 N.C. 727, 142 S.E.2d 585 (1965).
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action for the wrongful death of an eleven-year-old retarded boy for the
same reason, should now be deemed to have been overruled legislatively.
The statute will create new questions in cases involving death from
prenatal injury since the provision for nominal damages and the allowance
of more liberal recoveries weaken the holdings in Gay v. Thompson7' and
Stetson v. Easterling.76 In Gay, the court, denying recovery for the
wrongful death of a stillborn child, said:
We have based our decision on the ground there can be no evidence
from which to infer "pecuniary injury resulting from" the wrongful
prenatal death of a viable child en ventre sa mere; it is all sheer
speculation. Consequently it is not necessary for us to decide in this
case the debatable question as to whether a viable child en ventre sa
mere, who is born dead, is a person within the meaning of our wrong-
ful death act.
77
Since damages are no longer confined to pecuniary injury, the courts will
now have to reconsider whether a viable child in its mother's womb who
is born dead is a person within the meaning of the wrongful death
statute. It may be significant that there is North Carolina authority for
treating a child in its mother's womb as a person for other purposes,
particularly if property is involved.78
Stetson, decided two years after Gay, denied a cause of action for the
loss of a child who died a few months after birth as a result of prenatal
brain injuries. The basis for the court's decision was that the plaintiff
would not be able to show pecuniary loss; the court remarked that
"[h]ere, as in Gay, it would be 'sheer speculation' to attempt to assess
damages as of the time of the alleged negligently inflicted fatal injuries." 70
The court will also have to reconsider Stetson in light of the new
statute and decide whether to allow recovery when the death results from
prenatal injuries and shortly follows a live birth. In determining this
question, the court will first have to settle whether a child has a right
to recover for prenatal injuries that do not result in his death, since sec-
tion 28-173 of the wrongful death statute requires that the decedent have
had a cause of action had he survived before there can be any recovery
1- 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966).
"8274 N.C. 152, 161 S.E.2d 531 (1968).
" 266 N.C. at 402, 146 S.E. 2d at 431.
"See, e.g., State v. Jordan, 227 N.C. 579, 580-81, 42 S.E.2d 674, 675 (1947);
State v. Forte, 222 N.C. 537, 23 S.E.2d 842 (1943) ; cf. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-5
(1966); Note, Right of Action for Prenatal Injury, 28 N.C.L. REv. 245 (1950).
70274 N.C. at 157, 161 S.E.2d at 534 (two justices dissented).
[Vol. 48
WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTE
for wrongful death. This threshold issue has not been squarely faced
in North Carolina except in Stetson itself, in which the court said in
dictum that a cause of action for a prenatal injury not resulting in death
would be allowed. 80  Furthermore, there is language in Stetson indi-
cating that the court would have found a cause of action for wrongful
death.under a statute resembling the one now in effect in North Carolina:
We are advertent to the fact the result reached here is in conflict
with the result reached in decisions elsewhere ....
There are marked differences between the statutory provisions in
force in these jurisdictions and "our Death Act. . . ." Only the Ohio
and Illinois statutes contain the phrase "pecuniary injury." In these
jurisdictions, apparently no formula or rule has been adopted for
determining "pecuniary injury," such as the rule well established in
this jurisdiction .... Too, it is noted that in Illinois, contrary to the
North Carolina rule . . . , nominal damages are recoverable in an
action for wrongful death.8 '
CONCLUSION
"All changed, changed utterly ....
On the whole the change is good. Perhaps most significantly, non-
working wives were not ignored by the drafters of North Carolina's
wrongful death statute. Nor were the retarded, the aged, and, hopefully,
children born with the expectation of certain and immediate death from
prenatal injuries. Portions of the statute need rethinking, however, and
the ambiguous language in some provisions will require considerable
interpretation by the courts to resolve many of the uncertainties.
THOMAS A. McNEELY
"O Id. at 155-56, 161 S.E.2d at 533-34.
811d. at 157, 161 S.E.2d at 534-35.
82W. B. YEATS, Easter.
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